The Second Coming of the Theocratic Age? Islamic Discourse after Modernity and Postmodernity

The Second Coming of the Theocratic Age? Islamic Discourse after Modernity and Postmodernity Aslam Farouk-Alli INTRODUCTION No serious scholar of Islam can deny the impact that modernity and postmodernity have had upon contemporary Islamic thought. In this essay I will outline how current Islamic thought has been impacted upon by these intellectual discourses. I will proceed from the inception of modernity and go on to discuss developments in the postmodern period. In my final analysis I will discuss contemporary Islamic thought and the discontents of modernity and postmodernity. By taking recourse to the work of current-day Islamist thinkers who are responding to the intellectual challenges of modernity and postmodernity, we are able to gauge the deep introspection that these two very important paradigms have effected upon contemporary Islamic discourse. From this perspective then, the impact of modernity and postmodernity upon Islamic discourse can hardly be construed of negatively. The Secular/Islamist polemic is an essential contributing factor to the emergence of a clearer conception of Islamic identity in current times. While the issue of identity will not be addressed in significant detail, the critique of modernity and postmodernity that is offered is certainly compelling evidence suggesting the emergence of a far more articulate and clearer Islamic self-image. The task of exploring the conception of an authentic Islamic self-image is beyond the scope of this essay, but interrogating the philosophical discourses of modernity and postmodernity is an absolutely essential preliminary step that lays the necessary groundwork for such a venture. ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND MODERNITY Before considering the relationship between Islamic thought and modernity, it is important to briefly survey the background that gave rise to modernity. This should place us in a position to satisfactorily appreciate the aspirations and disappointments invoked by this important paradigm of thought. It is generally contended that the roots of modernity as a philosophical discourse can be traced back to the period of the Enlightenment. In the Middle Ages, prior to the Enlightenment, Europe was gripped in the clutches of an intense struggle between science and religion. The discoveries of great figures like Kepler, Copernicus, Gilbert and Galileo provided a basis on which to challenge traditional religious worldviews concerning the nature of the universe. The price paid for challenging religious cosmological doctrines was very high. Galileo, for example, faced persecution for positing scientific theories that ran contrary to the religious dogma of the Catholic Church. However, the changing tides ensured that the tyrannical rule of the church did not last much longer. The Enlightenment marked a decisive epistemological break from the thought paradigm of the Middle Ages. The Christian Church’s hegemony over institutions of knowledge and its power to determine the very nature of knowledge was now being challenged. The central role of religious ideas in politics was also brought into question. Within the broader spectrum of world history these changes were as significant as the classical Graeco-Roman outlook (which flourished up to the fourth century AD) and the triumph of Christianity in the Roman Empire. The emergent Christian worldview replaced the Graeco-Roman outlook and proceeded to dominate Europe until the seventeenth century.[1] With the onset of the eighteenth century modern ideas and arguments that came to the fore shifted the focus of the Looking-Glass. Philosophers now began to openly scrutinise the worldview of the church. The Enlightenment also became known as the age of reason because the philosophy of that time emphasised reason and rationality over the speculative theology of the church. Rationalism and empiricism were now core elements of epistemology, displacing speculative and theological metaphysics. Concepts like Reason, Empiricism, Science, Universalism, Progress, Individualism, Tolerance, Freedom, Uniformity of Human Nature, and Secularism, resonate throughout this period. These major themes form the very core of philosophical modernity and are still invoked today. Thus, the Enlightenment removed religion as principle and base of identity and replaced it with reason. Human worth was now measured in terms of ethics and utility rather than creed and piety.[2] In return for a compromise on faith, modernity was able to rekindle the imagination and instil confidence in the ability of the subjective-self. Modernity rewarded humankind’s spiritual loss with material gain. The scientific advances made in the last four centuries surpassed the collective efforts of every epoch preceding it. In spite of the material success of the Enlightenment, the philosophy that it had conceived would exact an extremely costly toll on humanity later on in history. The darker side of modernity shadowed a culture of suffering and genocide. Developments in the Muslim world were by no means as drastic. Foremostly, there was no fundamental epistemological shift from a hegemonic religious paradigm to a militantly rationalist one. Science, Reason and Religion co-existed in a relatively peaceful relationship. As early as the twelfth century the great philosopher of Islam, Abu-H*a*mid al-Ghaza*li*, advocated the view that the best of sciences were those that combined transmitted (religious) knowledge with rational knowledge and where revelation is accompanied by opinion. In terms of scientific discovery the Dark Ages of Europe were a time of illumination in the Muslim world. Philosophy as well as the natural sciences were pursued with vigour. Although the advances that were made in this period served as an important foundation for the European Enlightenment, there was no sharp turn upward towards great breakthroughs. Consequently, the later advances and discoveries in the West enabled it to transcend the geographic confines of Europe and reverberations were soon felt throughout the world. Famous centres of learning in the Islamic world were surpassed by their Western counterparts. With the onset of modernity history witnessed the emergence of the West as a new World Power. Scientific advances in the West granted it dominance second to none. Along with material superiority came power, followed by a tremendous thirst for conquest. The military force of the West easily satiated its territorial appetite and in a relatively short period of time two-thirds of the world was colonised by it. Military colonisation was inevitably accompanied by cultural invasion that proved to be far more exacting. The intellectual and cultural heritage of Islam – along with that of other civilisations – was forced into dormancy. While scholars have argued that the world had been disenchanted – freed from superstitious, mythical beliefs – by Western modernity, one can say with certainty that the West was simultaneously enchanting the rest of the world. By the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire awakened to the changing world realities and embarked upon a systematic and comprehensive programme of modernisation. The bitter reality was that the newly emerging world was not that of the `*ulama*; its languages were French, Italian and English, and its logic, idioms and methods were all equally foreign to Muslims.[3] Such desperate attempts at modernisation only served to emphasise the superiority of the West over the Muslim world. Not only did Muslims imitate the West in its methods of governance but it also began imbibing its very philosophy of living. The fact that Western modernity was a product of a very specific and unique experience is lost to such attempts at imitation. The impact of these imitative attempts is what is still being grappled with today. Islamic thought is now permeated with a philosophy that has entered from without. It may be argued that this is not unique in any way and that no philosophy remains untouched by syncretism. However, the failure or success of such conflations depends entirely on whether any common ground exists between what are indeed very distinct paradigms. Tensions are bound to arise in any endeavour that hopes to mix the unmixable. In spite of these tensions, there are always those who are willing to attempt such a rapprochement. Thus, the relationship between contemporary Islamic discourse and modernity must now be considered so as to gauge the impact of such attempts. In the nineteenth century the West advocated and firmly believed in the inevitability of progress and the power of human reason. The western mindset made a clear break with the past and maintained a strong forward-looking orientation. Ideas of God and transcendence slowly became fading memories. The attraction of modernity invoked varying responses from Muslim intellectuals. The Muslim mindset, in contrast, was strongly attached to a glorious past and could not easily break away from its roots. It still maintained an undeniably atavistic posture. Upon reflection, one is able to empathise with such a position. For Muslim intellectuals of the early twentieth century Islam still had much to offer in terms of its philosophical orientation and depth. Even though modernity had given the West the upper hand in terms of material progress, this was by no means reason enough to dismiss the Islamic worldview altogether. This sentiment finds full expression in the thought of Jama*l al-Di*n al-Afgha*ni*. For al-Afgha*ni*, Islam was foremost a belief in the transcendence of God and in reason. At a very early stage, al-Afgha*ni* had realised that reason alone was not sufficient for humankind's prosperity. Although he enjoined embracing modernity, he remained weary of the strains it placed upon religion. His disciple Muhammad `*Abduh followed a similar trajectory. `*Abduh asked how the gap between Islam and modernity could be bridged and answered that Muslims had to accept the need for change based on the principles of Islam. This tradition of engaging modernity was continued by the likes of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. More recent scholars like the late Muh*ammad al-Ghaza*li* contended that certain elements of the modern West had to be accepted, but there are certain philosophical standpoints that are unacceptable to Islam. All the above intellectuals represent an engagement with modernity that is more or less critical. Such expressions were inevitably labelled fundamentalist and enjoyed little credibility amongst those that strongly upheld and embraced modernity. As will be seen later, in view of the broader scope of social discourse, voices of resurgent Islam were seen as no more than intellectual aberrations by the proponents of modernity who appropriated the dominant Western discourse that still preached the doctrine of modernity with full confidence. This would not continue indefinitely and the rise of postmodernity gave legitimacy to many divergent voices, including that of Islam's. However, it is imperative that we consider modernist trends within the Islamic tradition before moving on to discuss postmodernity and the rise of critical alternatives to modernity. As suggested, many Muslim scholars were willing to embrace modernity far more warmly. In most cases this involved making substantial adjustments to traditionally held views. I will consider the case of one such scholar, Bassam Tibi, in order to represent this position. There are naturally as many opinions on the project of modernity as there are scholars engaged in its study. It would be naïve as such to treat the entire spectrum of discourse as homogenous and static. However, there are certain trends that can be assumed to be representative of a mainstream position. Tibi’s discourse consequently emerges as a good general reflection on modernity because he assumes an overtly apologetic posture towards it. He is therefore well placed for the expressed purpose of drawing out the contrast between Islam and modernity. Tibi has published several works related to Islam and modernity.[4] For him, the European project of modernity is normative in terms of determining what constitutes knowledge. He not only affirms the aims of the Enlightenment project but also regards them as necessary for progress and development. I will outline some of the philosophical implications of modernity and link them to Tibi’s thought before going into a detailed exposition of his views. I will thereafter consider criticisms of this position. This should lead us to a general critique of modernity. For Tibi, modernity is a cultural project that triggered off a man-centred secular worldview and as such an insight into the capability of man to know and to change his social environment autonomously, regardless of supernatural forces such as God’s will.[5] On this basis he asserts that modernity, as an epistemology, is a French achievement inspired by Rene¢ Descartes. This epistemology entrenches the principal of subjectivity, which – in philosophical terms – refers to individual freedom. In its form of self-consciousness, subjectivity determines all aspects of modern culture, in particular, modern knowledge. Descartes’ epistemology impacted profoundly upon the course of knowledge. As Richard Harland explains: “The Cartesian philosophy of the cogito proclaimed the private ‘I think’ as the only possible source for truth and explanation after the external phenomena of the world had all been ‘doubted’ away”.[6] He further asserts that the ‘I’ philosophy tradition of Descartes, Kant and Husserl is the primary and self-sufficient base upon which knowledge is to be founded - primary and self-sufficient not in the way of objective things, but in the way of an undetermined creative source. As a result, all of these philosophers make a space for individual free will in their philosophies. In this regard, Tibi is careful to point out that this is not an atheistic position. He argues that even Descartes acknowledges that God creates man but that man is able to create knowledge on his own, by his own means. Therefore modernity, as described by Tibi, results in what Parvez Manzoor has described as a ‘de-divinised public order.’ A natural consequence of this development is that ultimate values in such a social structure are political and existential as opposed to religious and trans-existential, which is the normative ideal in Muslim communities.[7] In epistemological terms this represents a shift from metaphysics to positivism. Practically, this is manifested in replacing belief in the presence of absolute knowledge that resides beyond human capacity with the pursuit of partial knowledge that could be gathered and verified through scientific methods. Stated differently, this is a shift from belief in an absolute truth that controlled human life to belief in partial scientific truths that could be used by humans to control nature.[8] As a result of this shift, an increasing number of social scientists consider metaphysics a fading religious pastime and hold that it should have been driven away from the human mental endeavour a long time ago. Tibi is no different and develops this orientation further, arguing that the only viable approach to Islam in the modern world is the sociological one. Considering Tibi’s emphatic and wholehearted endorsement of modernity, it comes as no surprise that he considers resurgent voices of Islam as being fundamentalist - in the full pejorative sense. He as such asserts that contemporary Muslim fundamentalists contest the secular knowledge based on the cultural project of modernity, as well as the worldview related to it. He bases this on his conception of modernity, which he regards as being composed of an institutional dimension – an idea he borrows from Anthony Giddens – as well as a cultural project, as held by Habermas. For Tibi these two concepts are inextricable. Any society wishing to make a successful transition to a modern social system needs both. The problem is that while the institutional dimension of modernity has been globalised, the cultural project has not, even though this possibility was not dismissed in the early post-colonial period. Later however, cultural reassertion advocated the rejection of alien knowledge, which meant banishing cultural modernity. Tibi finds it paradoxical that in the case of Islam the adoption of alien instruments, i.e. modern science and technology was endorsed. He as such refers to this phenomenon as “the Islamic dream of semi-modernity” which indicates “Muslim fundamentalist ambivalence vis-à-vis modernity and its tendency to split it into two components”.[9] For him the basic dilemma of contemporary Muslims with regards to their attitudes towards modern knowledge is that they simultaneously envisage adopting the instruments of modernity while rejecting its cultural underpinnings. In so doing, Tibi contends that they separate the achievements of modernity from the very knowledge that led to it and first made it possible. He argues that the essence of cultural modernity is the Cartesian cogito ergo sum i.e. that knowledge of man stems from the doubt out of which certain human knowledge of the objective world grows. For him fundamentalism submits man to Allah's will whereas Cartesianism helps man to recognise himself as res cogitans - a thinking subject. In epistemological terms this translates as a shift from a religious worldview to a modern worldview. In rather prejudicial fashion Tibi thus concludes that any project - whether religious, postmodern or fundamentalist - that questions this worldview results in irrationalism.[10] Tibi would thus have us believe that the root problem with any alternative worldview lies in its conception of knowledge. Only modern western knowledge is normative and the expression of any alternative that seeks to embark ‘on the de-Westernisation of knowledge’ is simply not epistemologically grounded. This is also the major objection that Tibi raises against Islam. Islam and all other de-Westernised sciences are not founded on the modernist principle of abstract subjectivity, which is the view that man is able to establish human knowledge of the objective world and to subject these discoveries to the pursuit of satisfying human needs. Tibi argues that Islamised sciences - though not traditional - are subordinated to religious traditions and as such do not permit the reflective posture of the Westernised sciences. By his estimation these attitudes toward modern science and technology do not contribute to the accommodation of modern knowledge that Muslim people urgently need for the development of their societies. He further holds that such attitudes reflect the beginnings of a new counter-scientific trend in Arab culture. His biggest fear is that the politics of the Islamisation of knowledge could result in ‘a new era of flat-earthism’.[11] Tibi further contends that the twentieth century is the age of global confrontation between secular cultural modernity and religious culture. He raises several questions that explicitly indicate his commitment to the secular vision of modernity. He asks why it is that Muslims are unable to share this view; why do they always use the fact of colonial rule to dismiss cultural modernity; and why do they involve the belief in Allah to disregard the ability of man. His explanation for all of this is that Muslim fundamentalist efforts to de-Westernise knowledge seeks to reverse the ‘disenchantment of the world’ and thus to subject man to supernatural powers. Tibi’s implication is glaringly obvious: any reassertion of Islam stands the risk of taking us back to the Dark Ages. What is most striking about his entire argument is its complete endorsement of classical modernity. He seems to see very distinct similarities between the European Enlightenment and the current need for Islam to modernise. Just as Europe had freed itself from the shackles of Christianity, so too must the Arab/Muslim world be emancipated from the stifling teachings of Islam. This obviously suggests that he sees it fit to parallel the Christian paradigm of the Middle Ages with that of Islam. At the very least, such an extrapolation is glaringly naïve. Critics have pointed out several other problems with Tibi’s discourse. These will very briefly be considered before discussing the more general critiques of the modernist project he so passionately endorses. Pieterse points out that Tibi’s work presents a rather severe case of dichotomic thinking which caricaturises both the West and Islam. He argues that Tibi equates the West with modernity, which in turn is neatly lined up with Cartesianism. In a similar way Islam is homogenised under the heading of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’.[12] Parvez Manzoor’s far more fiery response criticises Tibi for exhausting all his energies only to produce a one-sided indictment of ‘Muslim fundamentalism’ and offering an ill-conceived and ineptly executed apology of modernity. He goes even further, arguing that Tibi’s vision of modernism is intellectually dated, philosophically shallow and ideologically docile.[13] Even though this last criticism seems fully justified, it does not spare the task of responding to the claims that Tibi makes. The fact that Tibi chooses to subject Islam to a modernist critique justifies an exploration of the critiques of modernity. It is thus necessary to consider both the philosophical and ideological critiques raised in response to modernity. CRITICISMS OF MODERNITY By now it should be clear that modernity has been defined in terms of beliefs and values identified with Enlightenment thought, relentless pursuit of progress, and control of nature for the wellbeing of humanity. These beliefs and values have been conceptualised by way of promises and ideals held to be lofty and true, in the most absolute sense. As such, the failure of these promises and the discontent of these ideals would naturally lead to crisis. The aspirations of the modernist vision of society have been expressed by many contemporary scholars, of which Tibi is just one example. In what follows some of the shortcomings of this vision will be explored. This should lead back to the philosophical underpinnings of modernity, which will then be critiqued. The counter-wave against modernity gave rise to postmodernity, which will be considered hereafter. John Esposito, a contemporary scholar of note, eloquently pronounces that “the world at the dawn of the twenty-first century challenges the ‘wisdom’ and expectations of the prophets of modernity”.[14] Current scepticism towards modernisation and development theory challenges the longstanding claim that the development of modern states and societies requires Westernisation and secularisation. Although Westernisation has indeed developed and advanced the bureaucratic mechanisms of modern society, it has not been nearly as successful at eradicating the predicaments of humanity. In this regard Parvez Manzoor contends that the expression ‘crisis of modernity’ needs to be understood in terms of modernity’s inability to redeem its promise of delivering a model of perfect historical order. Explaining further, he emphasises that modern societies are not helpless at facing the inner challenges of governance and economy, which are primary determinants of the human condition in terms of the modernist vision, nor are modern polities vulnerable to any threats by external enemies. Rather, upholders of the modernist vision are perplexed by the realisation that their global city is not a city of humanity.[15] Ali Bulaç, a Turkish Islamist scholar, lends his support to this criticism by focusing on the plight of the environment as well as the individual. He exclaims that although modernism had promised paradise on earth, it has instead turned the entire planet into a living hell. He goes further, adding that along with pollution of the environment modernism has also succeeded in polluting the soul.[16] While many have equated the western discourse of modernity with secularism, not much attention has been focused on the above description of modernity as a dual-pollutant which encompasses more than just a philosophy that advocates the separation of church and state. Abdelwahab Elmessiri is one of the few scholars to have elaborated on this in some detail. Elmessiri contends that the identity of western modernity is more in keeping with what he refers to as comprehensive secularism. The separation of church and state is a worldview that cannot claim any comprehensiveness and he thus refers to it as partial secularism. He argues that such a worldview confines itself to the realm of politics and perhaps economics, but maintains complete silence on absolute or permanent values, be they moral, religious or otherwise. It also does not address itself to ultimate things like the origin of humanity, human destiny, the purpose of life and other matters. By contrast, he points out that comprehensive secularism is a completely different outlook that does not merely aim at the separation of church and state and some aspects of public life; it aims at the separation of all values - religious, moral, or human - not only from the state but also from public and private life and from the world at large.[17] For him, it is in this comprehensive regard that Western modernity and secularism are almost synonymous. In referring to one the other is also tacitly implied. As such, Elmessiri defines Western modernity as the adoption of value-free science as the basis of humanity’s world outlook and as a source of values and norms. This outlook reorients the individual to follow value-free laws instead of modifying the world to fit human needs and aspirations. History itself stands witness against and testifies to the disastrous consequences of this worldview. However, in order to manifest this more clearly there has to be a move towards a more holistic reading of history, more specifically, a more holistic reading of the history of secularism itself. Elmessiri argues that in the Western world the paradigmatic sequence of immanentisation (i.e. the shift from a transcendental worldview to a material one), and therefore secularisation, modernisation and naturalisation, began sometime in the Middle Ages. This occurred when some economic enclaves ‘freed’ themselves from Christian values or concepts such as ‘fair price’. He goes on to explain that only strictly economic criteria now applied to economic activity and success and failure was stripped of any moral or human considerations. He thus asserts that the economic sphere was immanantised, becoming value-free, referring only to itself, its criteria and standards being immanent in it. This development established a pattern that repeated itself in all other spheres of human activity.[18] Another significant example of this pattern alluded to by Elmessiri is that of the political sphere. He draws our attention to the birth of the theory of the modern state during the Renaissance. The state, in this instance, became value-free, justifying itself by the raison de’ etat rather than seeking legitimacy on a religious or moral basis. As a result the realm of politics freed itself from any values external to it, and was judged by criteria immanent to it. In similar vein, all spheres of human life, including science, were freed from religious and moral values and considerations, becoming self-sufficient, self-regulating, self-transforming, and self-explanatory. Elmessiri bemoans the fact that this emergent secular worldview was never clearly articulated because the history of secularism was monitored by the Western social sciences in a piecemeal and diachronic fashion. This history was fragmented into various bits, first humanism and/or the Reformation, the Enlightenment, rationalism, and utilitarianism; then the counter-Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Darwinism; then positivism, existentialism, phenomenology; and finally the end of history and postmodernism. This piecemeal approach concealed many of the more appalling aspects of the Western modernist worldview. Elmessiri argues that this resulted in some of the most shameful ideologies of the recent past like Racism, Imperialism and Nazism being seen as mere aberrations, having a history of their own, distinct from the history of secularism and modernity. When the Western modernist worldview is approached holistically it becomes apparent that these so-called aberrations are in fact part and parcel of the Western civilisational model. His central contention is that by grasping this overall unity and articulating it into a comprehensive paradigm - thereby developing a uniform and complex paradigm of secularism - we are able to unmask the relationship between the Enlightenment and Deconstruction; between modernisation, modernism and postmodernism; between Nietzcheanism and Hitler, pragmatism and Eichmann; between rationalism, imperialism, and the Holocaust. From the vantage point of this novel paradigm it becomes much easier to expose the moral and socio-political trappings of the modernist vision. Elmessiri points out that in light of the above it is not plausible to regard oppressive ideologies of the past and the present - like Nazism and Zionism - as exceptional cases because modernist discourse reflects a general pattern of extermination that began in the West from the time of the Renaissance in countries like North America, right up to the present in countries like Vietnam, Chechnya and Bosnia[19] On the basis of this analysis, his contention that there is a direct link between Western civilisation and genocide is quite compelling. He supports this position on several grounds. Firstly, he points out that Western civilisation is a technological civilisation that elevates progress at any price, even to the detriment of humanity. The resultant hardship and suffering, both physically and spiritually, are not of much significance in a culture that supports the principle of the survival of the fittest and ignores traditional values like being charitable to the weak and lending assistance to those in need. By this logic the Nazis were able to legitimate the extermination of the Jews because they were viewed as non-productive or useless. This was admittedly an extreme solution but Elmessiri argues that other Western countries like America and Poland bear a certain degree of culpability because they refused to give asylum to this “useless” ethnic grouping. A second trend that justifies drawing parallels between genocide and Western culture is that the “solution” to the Jewish problem adopted by the Nazis shares many similarities with solutions adopted by other Western Imperialist countries. The genocide of the Red Indians of America is an appropriate example. Elmessiri points out that Nazism and Imperialism share the common belief of the superiority of the Arian race. Finally, he points out that a central trait of Western civilisation - and a phenomenon common to both Zionism and Nazism - is the rationality of its procedures and methods and the irrationality of its objectives and goals. He notes that this is a characteristic of Western civilisation that has also been discussed in the writings of Max Weber, the famous sociologist. Perhaps the best examples of this antinomy between objective and method are the Nazi death camps and the systematic expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland. In both these cases horrendous atrocities are afflicted upon a target population with the utmost precision and planning. Charles Taylor, the distinguished Canadian philosopher, raises similar criticisms of modernity. He identifies three malaises of modernity that challenge blissful human existence. These are individualism, the primacy of instrumental reason, and the loss of freedom resulting from the preceding two. In his words: “The first fear is about what we might call a loss of meaning, the fading of moral horizons. The second concerns the eclipse of ends, in face of rampant instrumental reason. And the third is about a loss of freedom”.[20] Taylor equates individualism with a loss of purpose. Its darker side involves a centring on the self, which both flattens and narrows our lives making them poorer in meaning and less concerned with others or society. These results are manifested in expressions such as “permissive society”, “me generation”, or the prevalence of narcissism. He explains the second malaise of Modernity -instrumental reason – as a kind of rationality that we draw on when we calculate the most economical application of means to a given end. In this scheme of things maximum efficiency and the best cost-output ratio is the measure of success. Bringing the two together, he argues that on the political level individualism and instrumental reason have frightening consequences. He points out that giving weight to instrumental reason, in serious moral deliberation, may be highly destructive. Elmessiri has aptly demonstrated this earlier. Taylor thus concludes that any society structured around instrumental reason imposes a great loss of freedom on both individuals and the group because it is not only our social decisions that are shaped by these forces. He rightfully contends that an individual lifestyle is hard to sustain against the grain. In other words, yielding to the pressure of conformity is no less a loss of freedom then submitting to the dictates of instrumental reason. Although the modernist vision was inspired by the potential of the individual at its inception, history has clearly shown that this has not always been to the advantage of either the individual or society. As has been argued above, humanity - as a collective - has had to suffer the consequences of what has only recently been recognised as a warped vision. Modernity, as a philosophy, did indeed aspire towards moral and socio-political upliftment and therefore its failure can only be attributed to an inherent weakness in its vision. Parvez Manzoor, a trenchant critic of modernity, provides an apt and concise summary of the main contentions raised against it and it is worth quoting him at length. In his unique style, Parvez Manzoor points out: - that the truth claims of Enlightenment reason are based on circular logic; - that the notion of a sovereign, transcendent and ahistorical, subject whose reason is the touchstone of all knowledge is extremely ‘problematic’; - that the doctrine of progress is ‘paradoxical’; - that the cult of freedom which renders all ‘taboos’ illegitimate and unnecessary is inimical to the preservation of any kind of moral, and by extension, social and political, order; - that the charter of the modern political community, nay any political community, is always parochial and exclusive; - that the universality of justice and rights is a metaphysical claim that cannot be redeemed within a socio-political context; - indeed, that the jurisdiction of both reason and meaning extends far beyond the cosmopolis of modernity.[21] Hindsight sometimes casts harsh glances upon the past and it therefore has to be remembered that time alone can tell whether visions of the future are to meet with success or not. Bearing this in mind, Parvez Manzoor indicates that the delegitimation of modernity is important because it not only opens up a new intellectual space, but it also creates a different agenda for a dialogue between modernists and others. Most scholars now reject the claims made by modernity as rather tenuous. This marked the shift, once again, from one paradigm of thought to another. Loss of faith in the project of modernity was accompanied by the onset of postmodernity. FROM THE DISCONTENTS OF MODERNITY TO POSTMODERNITY Seyyed Hossein Nasr, a prominent contemporary Islamic scholar, remarks that until Descartes the various levels of reality that determined human existence were understood in relation to God. Then, with the onset of Cartesian rationalism, individual human existence became the criterion of reality and truth. In the mainstream of Western thought, ontology gave way to epistemology, epistemology to logic, and finally logic was confronted by the antirational ‘philosophies’ so prevalent today.[22] Abdelwahab Elmessiri is once again helpful in charting out the course that saw the shift from modernity and its discontents to postmodernity.[23] As mentioned earlier, he argues that modernity – and therefore comprehensive secularism – is a form of immanence, implying that rising levels of secularisation meant rising levels of immanentisation. This naturally leads to the virtual disappearance of God as the transcendental organising power in the universe: We can view the whole process of immanentization / modernization / secularization in terms of the death of God discourse. God first became incarnate not in man but in humanity as a whole, and not temporarily but permanently. This led to the rise of humanism and the solipsistic subject. This humanism became racism when God is incarnate in one people; it becomes fascism when God is incarnate in the leader . . . . But the process went on inexorably, and immanentization (secularization / modernization) went deeper. The center kept on shifting and the incarnations became too many, until we were faced with multiple centers. Nature itself was fragmented and atomized. Losing its stability, coherence, and self-referentiality, it could no longer serve as a stable centre.[24] We now have to turn our attention to postmodernism in order to make sense of the shift from a fixed centre – as in the case of modernity – to the rise of multiple centres, multiple alternatives, and a multiplicity of truths. THE POSTMODERN WORLDVIEW Many scholars express the view that postmodernity is no more than a continuation or a further unfolding of modernity. Elmessiri describes postmodernity as a move from “the solid logocentric stage of modernity to its liquid stage, the stage of materialist irrationalism and antiheroism and a centerless world”.[25] Whereas modernity had renounced the authority of religion – displacing metaphysics in favour of reason – postmodernity no longer asserts anything positive or substantive. Postmodern theory renounces even reason as a foundational theory of norms: Modernist consciousness, which progressively shifted its gaze from ‘reason’ to ‘nature’ to ‘history’, now proclaims that there exists no Archemedian point, no foundational text, that may guide our humanity towards any desirable or conceivable goal. Rather, the admission is that reason is unable to overcome the antinomy of norm and history, that the ‘is’ of world-history does not lead to any ‘ought’ of the human existence.[26] So, while postmodernity does indeed proceed on the same continuum as modernity, it can be more accurately described as “the rejection of modernist ideology in a modern world”.[27] Modernist ideology had previously dictated that reason alone can prevail and that only through reason can human beings conquer and control nature. At the very least, modernist ideology sought to cast a firm and absolute foundation that served as the basis of reality. Postmodernity, by contrast, argues that there are multiple realities that are not necessarily related.[28] The postmodern condition is one that transcends the arguments and battles of which view of reality was true to the position that none are true.[29] This sceptical posture is a true reflection of the fundamental axiomatic principal of postmodernist thought: suspicion and rejection of all ‘grand narratives’. Postmodernists refer to any legitimating discourse as a ‘grand narrative’ or a ‘metanarrative’. Metanarratives or grand narratives are referred to as such because they claim to be able to account for, explain, and subordinate all lesser narratives. Religious ideologies like Islam and Christianity and political ideologies like Marxism are also examples of grand narratives in that they provide the ethos or worldview according to which the individual – and ultimately society – fashions his/her very existence. Reason – as a concept that informs truth and acts as the criterion for determining what constitutes knowledge – is another paradigm example of a grand narrative. It gained ascendancy in the 18th century when it was applied to every area of life like religion, morality, politics, and social life. Reason served as the foundational norm that was used to justify everything, just as religion before it. [Postmodernism] rejects the pursuit of “grand narratives” and denies the possibility of acquiring comprehensive knowledge through “scientific” methods. For postmodernism, reason cannot be a reliable source of knowledge because reason itself is a hegemonic project. Ultimate truth is impossible to attain because everyone has his/her own truth.[30] It should now be manifestly clear that the postmodern response to the crisis of modernity – the failure of its grand narratives – has been to relativise all truth claims. Whereas modernists sought to find meaning in totality, later scholars pointed out that the only secure thing about modernity is its insecurity; it is in a perpetual state of flux and it is this flux that defines the main nature of postmodernity.[31] Whereas progress had been the distinguishing feature of modernity, nihilism or the loss of any spiritual centre is what distinguishes postmodernity. While modernity sought to establish a foundational text – a foundational norm or grand narrative – that legitimated and explained its project, postmodernity vociferously rejected any kind of foundational text. In spite of this rejection, critics have argued that postmodern discourse is in itself nothing more then another grand narrative. It is as such imperative to consider this, as well as other criticisms of postmodernism. Powell makes the point that the notion that people have stopped believing in grand narratives because such narratives marginalise minorities inadvertently make the assumption that all people universally believe in justice, which is in itself another grand narrative.[32] Therefore, postmodernism is as guilty as modernism for perpetuating grand narratives. In denying any fixed or stable centre, postmodernism entrenches a centre-less world in a constant state of flux as the norm or only reality. Such relativism is not arbitrary and in fact engenders a unique philosophy of its own. For example, Elmessiri points out that postmodernism even has its own metaphysics despite its frantic attempt to deny any metaphysical stance.[33] He is of the view that while postmodernism denies transcendence, totality, permanence, and duality, its very denial has shown its true philosophical identity as an expression of the metaphysics of immanence. This is a point that has been alluded to earlier. While most critics concede that postmodernism has indeed proven to be effective as a critique of modernity, they also point out that it does not constitute an alternative social and political project due to its inherent cynicism and nihilism. However, postmodernist discourse has won favour with almost every marginalised ideology because of its inherent pluralistic nature. While it is not emphatic in endorsing any given position, it is by no means categorical in dismissing any given view either. This has created plenty of space for groups previously rejected by mainstream, hegemonic ideologies like modernity. A pertinent example is the re-emergence of religion and spirituality. The case of Islam will now be stressed to emphasise and explore this rebirth. FROM POSTMODERNISM TO ISLAMISM ‘*Ibra*hi*m Abu-Rabi`* contends that the resurgence of religion in both industrial and peasant societies is one of the most significant features of transcending postmodernism.[34] One may even argue that it is a resurgence borne out of the exasperation of treading on shaky ground. While postmodernism is to be fully acknowledged for creating the space that made such a resurgence possible, it has failed dismally – as a philosophy – to provide a firm foundation for an alternative world view. As a result, people have increasingly begun turning back to religion. Islamism, or the influence of an Islamic worldview in the socio-political sphere, is a specific example of this resurgence. Islamism is viewed as a product of the frustration of the promises of Western modernisation and, more specifically, represents a critique of modernism that displays remarkable similarities with postmodernism.[35] These similarities include a rejection of the determinism, rationalism, and positivism of the modernist paradigm.[36] However, there are fundamental differences between Islamism and postmodernism that ultimately make them incompatible. Bulaç explains that Islam is ultimately a ‘total doctrine’ that rejects the universalism and relativism of postmodernism.[37] In spite of the fundamental differences, it is quite enlightening to explore the fascination that postmodernism holds for Islamists. Mustafa Armagan, another Islamist thinker, is helpful in this regard. He explains that: […] postmodernism is attractive to Islamists because: (1) it shows the failures and limitations of modernism; (2) given the exhaustion of modernism, the postmodernist search for alternatives opens up an opportunity for Islam; (3) in their rejection of the secular uniformity of modernism, postmodernists freely borrow from tradition and religion which Islamists advocate; (4) the postmodernist emphasis on diversity and (5) the announcement of the death of ‘meta-narratives’ strengthens the hand of Islam in its struggle against modern ‘isms’ such as socialism, positivism or Darwinism.[38] Returning to the critique of postmodernism, Armagan argues that postmodernist ‘playfulness’ results in the rejection of a unitary point of reference for truth and thereby endorses the acceptance of multiple perspectives as equally valid. He therefore holds that this constitutes a second wave of secularisation. Explaining further, he argues that in the first phase of secularisation, undertaken by modernism, the self recreated the outside world (society, state, nature, art, religion, etc) by using reason. In the current phase of secularization, the self has begun to reflect on the outside world which the self created through reflection in the first place. Modernists, although secularized, still retained the traditional notion of a distinction between form and essence. For the postmodernists, however, form is everything – style constitutes content and rhetoric makes up reality.[39] Because of this, he regards postmodernism as a commercial paganism that turns religions into playthings and cannot as such be an ally to Islam. The stage is therefore now set for deep and critical introspection that should produce compelling solutions to the exigencies of everyday life. As is clearly apparent, such solutions are now being sought from Islam’s very own unique tradition. CONCLUSION By now it should be quite apparent that Islamic discourse did not readily surrender to the charms of the dominant discourses of modernity and postmodernity. There is no denying that certain scholars made strong cases in favour of modernist or postmodernist orientations, but these attempts only served to enhance the dissent of those who chose to speak in favour of an authentic Islamic alternative, in addition to embellishing their discourse with an added sophistication. What these unfolding developments clearly stress is that the discourses of modernity and postmodernity were by no means compelling enough to prompt a wholesale abandonment of the intellectual project of authentic Islam. It is in this light that we need to appreciate the rekindling of an authentic Islamic ideal or foundational text as an alternative to modernity and postmodernity. Condemnation of modernity’s grand-narrative solutions reaches near climax so it seems odd that Muslims should be arguing for the re-establishment of the foundational text – albeit on their own terms. Added to this is the sceptical voice of postmodernism still cautioning against the adoption of any grand narrative whatsoever. What is precisely established from the above exposition is that any Second Coming of the Theocratic Age does not necessarily imply simplistic atavistic posturing by Muslim intellectuals. Now more than ever, Islamic authenticity is being expressed in terms of moral existential imperatives. How one may aptly define Islamic authenticity or determine what the sources of these moral existential imperatives are must be the task of another inquiry. But for now it is enough to assert that Islamic discourse after modernity and postmodernity holds much more promise than unfounded fears of a return to an era of ‘flat-earthism’. REFERENCES [1] Huston Smith, Beyond the Post-Modern Mind (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 5. [2] Isma*`*il Ra*ji* al-Fa*ru*qi*, “Meta-Religion: Towards a Critical World Theology,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 3/1 (September, 1986): 17. [3] Basheer M. Nafi, The Rise and Decline of the Arab-Islamic Reform Movement (London: Crescent Publications (UK) Ltd., 2000), 37-38. [4] For a listing of these works, see: Bassam Tibi, “Culture and Knowledge: The Politics of Islamization of Knowledge as a Postmodern Project? The Fundamentalist Claim to De-Westernization,” Theory, Culture & Society, 12/1 (1995): 24. [5] ibid., p. 8 [6] Richard Harland, Superstructuralism: The Philosophy of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism (London and New York: Metheun, 1987), 43. [7] S. Parvez Manzoor, “Historical Order, Rational State, or Moral Community? Islamic Political Theory and the Challenges of Modernity,” in Proceedings, Twenty First Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, ed. M. M. Abul Fadl (Herndon, Virginia, USA: IIIT, 1993), 415-430. [8] Haldun Gulap, “Islamism and Postmodernism,” Contention 4/2 (1995, Winter): 62. [9] Tibi, Culture and Knowledge, p. 3. [10] ibid., p. 10 [11] ibid., p. 19 [12] J. N. Pieterse, “A Severe Case of Dichotomic Thinking,” Theory, Culture & Society, 13/4 (1996): 125-6. [13] S. Parvez Manzoor, “Reason-without-Text confronts Text-without-Reason,” The Muslim News (UK), 113 (1998, 25 September): 6. [14] John L. Esposito, “Islam and Secularism in the Twenty-First Century,” in Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, eds. J. L. Esposito & A. Tamimi (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2000), 1. [15] S. Parvez Manzoor, “Islam and the Crisis of Modernity,” http://www.algonet.se/~pmanzoor/, in: Parvez Manzoor's Homepage: Reconciling Transcendence with Existence. 21/10/2000. [16] Bulaç’s views are cited in: Gulap, Islamism and Postmodernism, p. 67. [17] Abdelwahab Elmessiri, “The Dance of the Pen, The Play of the Sign: A study in the relationship between modernity, immanence, and deconstruction,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 14/1 (1997, Spring): 2. [18] Abdelwahab Elmessiri, “Secularism, Immanance and Deconstruction,” in Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, eds. J. L. Esposito & A. Tamimi (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2000), 74. [19] `*Abd al-Waha*b al-Masi*ri* (Abdelwahab Elmessiri), al-Sahyu*ni’*a wa al-Na*zi’*a wa Niha*ya al-Ta*ri*kh – R’*uya H*ad*a*riy’*a Jadi*da (Cairo: Da*r al-Shuru*q, 1997), 11. [20] Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), 10. [21] Parvez Manzoor, Islam and the Crisis of Modernity. [22] Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 100. [23] Elmessiri, The Dance of the Pen, The Play of the Sign, pp. 6-9. [24] ibid. [25] ibid., p. 8. [26] S. Parvez Manzoor, “Modernity, Transcendence and Political Theory,” Encounters: Journal of Inter-Cultural Perspectives 5/1 (1999, March). [27] Gulap, Islamism and Postmodernism, p. 61. [28] ‘*Ibra*hi*m Abu-Rabi`*, “Beyond the Postmodern Mind,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 7/2 (1990): 251. [29] Smith, Beyond the Post-Modern Mind, p. 233. [30] Gulap, Islamism and Postmodernism, p. 62. [31] Abu-Rabi`*, Beyond the Postmodern Mind, p. 252. [32] James N. Powell, Postmodernism for Beginners (New York: Writers and Readers Publishing, Inc., 1998), 33. [33] Elmessiri, The Dance of the Pen, The Play of the Sign, p. 10. [34] Abu-Rabi`*, Beyond the Postmodern Mind, p. 255. [35] Gulap, Islamism and Postmodernism, p. 59. [36] Haldun Gulap, “Globalizing postmodernism: Islamist and Western Social Theory,” Economy and Society 26/3 (1997, August): 429. [37] Cited in: Gulap, Globalizing postmodernism, p. 429. [38] ibid. [39] ibid., p. 430. WORD COUNT 8040 words, including footnotes. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE Aslam Farouk-Alli is a Researcher at the Centre for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town (UCT), South Africa. He teaches Islamic Studies in the Department of Religious Studies and Arabic in the School of Languages and Literatures. He is also the Editor of the Annual Review of Islam in South Africa (ARISA) and the Managing Editor of the Journal for the Study of Religion. His recent publications include: 2002. “A Qur’anic Perspective and Analysis of the Concept of Sacred Space in Islam.” In Journal for the Study of Religion, 15, 1, pp. 63-78. 2003. “Cairo.” In Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Edited by Richard C. Martin. New York: Macmillan Reference USA. 2003. “Holy Cities.” In Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Edited by Richard C. Martin. New York: Macmillan Reference USA. 2003. “Modernization, Political: (1) Administrative, Military & Judicial Reform” In Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Edited by Richard C. Martin. New York: Macmillan Reference USA. · 2004. “Re-asserting the Moral Imperative: Islam and Science in the (Post)Modern Age.” In The Integrity of the Human Person in an African Context: Perspectives from Science and Religion. Edited by Cornel du Toit.